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Trust among Cybercriminals? Carding Forums, Uncertainty and 
Implications for Policing 
At the beginning of the 21
st
 Century, before the power of online social networking 
became apparent, several studies speculated about the likely structure of organised 
cybercrime (Mann and Sutton 1998; Brenner 2002). In the light of new data on 
cybercriminal organisations, this paper sets out to revisit their claims. In collaboration 
with the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA), this paper examines the structure of 
organised cybercrime by analysing data from online underground markets previously in 
operation over the Internet. In order to understand the various structures of organised 
cybercrime which have manifested, theories are drawn from social psychology, organised 
crime and transaction cost economics (TCE). Since the focus is on how uncertainty is 
mitigated in trading among cybercriminals, uncertainty is treated as a cost to the 
transactions and is used as the unit of analysis to examine the mechanisms cybercriminals 
use to control two key sources of uncertainty: the quality of merchandise and the identity 
of the trader. The findings indicate that carding forums facilitate organised cybercrime 
because they offer a hybrid form of organisational structure that is able to address sources 
of uncertainty and minimise transaction costs to an extent that allows a competitive 
underground market to emerge. The findings from this study can be used to examine 
other online applications that could facilitate the online underground economy.  
Keywords:  organised cybercrime; carding; underground economy; trust; transaction cost 
economics; social network 
Introduction 
Without a more comprehensive research study to determine who participates in crime 
on the Net—who provides demand and who supplies illicit services and products—we 
are not really in any position to speculate about typical NetOffenders  
(Mann and Sutton 1998: 223) 
In one of the first studies of cybercrime that used newsgroups and forums as the data source, 
Mann and Sutton highlighted the paucity of research into this emerging problem (1998). It is 
a fascinating article to return to in 2013 because the questions raised are still challenging 
criminologists and law enforcement today. One of the most interesting aspects of this study is 
the speculation that hacking would move from the creative to the acquisitive; from hacking 
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for the challenge to a financial endeavour. They also speculate on the problems for law 
enforcement, unused to this new method of doing (criminal) business and learning the trade. 
They suggested that some parts of the internet were becoming similar to the old rookeries of 
London, lawless and unfamiliar to the police. This article draws on more recent forums for its 
data source and explores the way that such forums have evolved to facilitate trust and 
financial crime on a huge scale. Carding forums are now closer to the legitimate world of 
high finance, than the low life of Gin Lane.  
 
According to the latest U.K. National Security Strategy (HM Government 2010), cybercrime 
has been assigned as a Tier-One threat to the United Kingdom, alongside international 





cybersecurity statistics (PwC 2012; IC3 2012) conclude that cybercrime remains as the 
primary threat facing nations, corporations and people in 2013.  In order to tackle cybercrime, 
it is vital for the policing community to understand the factors which has turned cybercrime 
into the persistent problem we are facing today. The purpose of this paper is to study the 
structure of carding forums on the web and to demonstrate how trust is an integral quality of 
them. Carding is the buying and selling of stolen credit card data (Peretti 2008). We do not 
ignore the role of the agent in the construction of cybercrime forums, but for the purposes of 
our argument here, we will focus on the theories and accounts that help explain how forums 
are structured to create trust among thieves, and what this implies for the policing of them 
(see also Webber and Yip 2013 for a discussion of the agent perspective on underground 
forums). 









Several recent cybercrime studies (Thomas and Martin 2006; Franklin et al 2007; Holt and 
Lampke 2010; Yip 2011; Yip, Shadbolt and Webber 2012) indicate that autonomous 
cybercriminals or “cyber-entrepreneurs” (Brenner 2002; Wall 2008) are collaborating and 
trading extensively over the Internet via different channels such as Internet Relay Chat (IRC)
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or on discussion forums (Holt and Lampke 2010). Furthermore, the “underground economy” 
appears to be highly competitive (Thomas and Martin 2008) with vendors supplying goods 
and service such as stolen credit cards, hacking and money laundering services to meet the 
demand (Peretti 2008). In particular, the lure of a lucrative return from trading in this 
underground economy has led to a continuous influx of skilful individuals into the 
cybercrime ecosystem and thus giving rise to a comprehensive “division of labour” 
(Gambetta 2000; Moore et al 2009; Wall 2008) which continuously supplies the resources 
that facilitate the commission of cybercrime. However, with the uncertainties surrounding 
computer-mediated communications (Jarvenpa and Leidner 1999; Walther 1995; 1996) such 
as anonymity and the need to span time, culture and space, a key question is, how do 
cybercriminals sustain sufficient levels of trust for collaborations to thrive? 
 
This problem was raised by Brenner (2002) who speculated on the organisational structure of 
online crime groups. Drawing from observations of physical crime groups such as the Mafia 
as well as trying to understand the functionalities facilitated by the Internet, Brenner 
concluded that online crime groups would almost certainly “emphasize lateral relationships, 
networks instead of hierarchies” (2002: 50). To what extent is this claim true? Is it still true? 
Will it hold true for the future? These are the questions this paper will try to address. 
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As proposed in various organised crime literatures (Cohen 1977; Pearson and Hobbs 2003; 
Hobbs 2001; Morselli and Petit 2007; McIllwain 1999; Van Calster 2006; Levi 2008; von 
Lampe and Johansen 2003; 2004; Lo 2010), the studying of organised crime should treat the 
relationships or “criminally exploitable ties” as the unit of analysis. This view is adopted in 
this paper. More precisely, this study focuses on the quality of relationships between the 
collaborations which is reflected by the presence of trust. Since the existence of a 
collaborative tie requires the presence of trust (Coleman 1993; Gambetta 2000; Dasgupta 
2000; Weerman 2003) and trust requires the mitigation of uncertainties, it can be seen that 
uncertainties are obstacles to collaborations. By applying transaction cost economics 
(Williamson 1979; 1991; 1993), uncertainty is treated in this paper as a transaction cost to a 
collaborative tie and it is assumed that cybercriminals have rational incentives for minimising 
this cost, an assumption that is implicit in many organised crime literatures regarding network 
structures (Williams 1998; Hobbs 2001; Pearson and Hobbs 2003; Morselli 2001; Morselli 
and Petit 2007; Kenny 2007; Lo 2010). Since previous studies demonstrate that the 
underground economy is thriving, this implies that cybercriminals have been able to 
minimise this cost sufficiently so that they are able to collaborate. The question here is how 
they have managed to do so. Therefore, in collaboration with the Serious Organised Crime 
Agency (SOCA), this study examines the ways in which trust is sustained in the underground 
economy and the implications this has on the structure of organised cybercrime, and in turn 
how it can be controlled (Williams 2007; Wall and Willams 2007). This is achieved through a 
qualitative analysis of the actual conversations between cybercriminals in online underground 
markets better known as “carding forums” (Holt and Lampke 2010; Peretti 2008; Glenny 
2011; Poulsen 2011). These forums are the site of tutorials, similar to newsgroups studied by 
Mann and Sutton (1998); a business market that is enabled by methods of creating and 
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maintaining trust; and a site that is at once public and private. They are also increasingly 
surveilled by law enforcement, such as the FBI in America and the Serious Organised Crime 
Agency (SOCA) in the UK. They have since been analysed by the authors using a variety of 
methodological approaches from Social Network Analysis (Wasserman and Faust 1994), to 
case study research using the interpretive tradition of symbolic interactionism, discourse 
analysis and conversation analysis (Webber and Yip 2013; Yip, Shadbolt and Webber 2012). 
This has allowed us to forge a unique synthesis between social and computer science. There 




Trust and Criminal Capital 
In order to examine the implications that trust has on organised cybercrime, it is important to 
first understand what trust is. A comprehensive definition of trust is given by Gambetta (2000) 
and forms the working definition from which we will work, albeit with awareness of the 
problems of assigning too rational an outlook on anyone, not least those engaging in carding 
related crimes: 
[T]rust (or, symmetrically, distrust) is a particular level of the subjective probability 
with which an agent assesses that another agent or group of agents will perform a 
particular action, both before he can monitor such action (or independently of his 
capacity ever to be able to monitor it) and in a context in which it affects his own 
action 
(2000:217: emphasis in original) 
In other words, trust is a mechanism for people to “cope with risk and uncertainty in 
interactions with others” (von Lampe and Johansen 2003: 103). Considering trust as a 
“property of collective units” such as ongoing relationships, groups and collectives (Lewis 
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and Weigert 1985: 968), if person A trusts person B then person A relies on B’s “integrity in 
the absence of sufficient means to control this other person’s behaviour” (von Lampe and 
Johansen  2003: 103).  Therefore, trust presupposes a situation of risk and that the risk can be 
avoided at the expense of the associated advantages (Luhmann 2000: 96).Those who decide 
to trust have purposefully and voluntarily chosen to accept the risk in the hope of favourable 
returns concerning their own actions under uncertain circumstances (McCarthy et al 1998: 
156). Trust then, is a product of rational expectation of the other to behave in a certain way in 
circumstances that are not formally controlled and without any “moral residue” (Dasgupta 
2000: 52; Hardin 1996: 28). However, due to the “limits of our capacity to achieve full 
knowledge of others, their motives and their responses to endogenous as well as exogenous 
changes” trust is also a “fragile response to our ignorance” (Gambetta 2000: 218). The 
rationale in trust is bounded by our capacity to anticipate the future behaviour of others. It is 
this bounded rationality which necessitates us to trust in the first place. Therefore, to trust 
someone, one has to “interpret” the context to which the trust relates in order to find good 
reasons to trust. When one’s interpretations become acceptable, the awareness of the 
“unknown, unknowable and unresolved is suspended” (Möllering 2001: 412-414). Through 
this combination of interpretation and suspension, one can then make the ultimate leap of 
faith that is required in most trust relationships. 
 
Nevertheless, with so many unfavourable conditions surrounding co-offending, it leaves one 
to wonder why co-offending is such a common phenomenon (Weerman 2003). Thus, a 
natural question is: what makes one willing to co-offend? Furthermore, what makes someone 
attractive as a co-offender? In order to answer these questions, it is important to understand 
why it is necessary for people to collaborate in the first place. The main reason for 
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collaboration is due to the need for social capital (Bourdieu 1986; Coleman 1988). As Burt 
(2000: 347) explains, social capital is “the contextual complement to human capital” and 
“inheres in the structure of relations between actors and among actors” (Coleman 1988: 98). 
In other words, social capital refers to the advantages that arise from connections with others. 
There are many kinds of social capital including obligations, expectations and trustworthiness, 
social norms and access to resources such as skills and information (Bourdieu 1986; Coleman 
1988; Portes 1998; McCarthy et al 1998; Uzzi 1997; Granovetter 1973 and 1985).  In crime, 




Ultimately, one is only willing to bear the risks and co-offend because it is profitable to do so 
(Weerman 2003: 404). Following this proposition then, it is evident that one is an attractive 
co-offender if one has “something to offer”, such as information, specialised skills or other 
scarce resources (McCarthy and Hagan 2001). However, since trust is a functional 
prerequisite to social relationships then an attractive co-offender also has to be sufficiently 
trustworthy for others to take the risk and trust they will not mess up their part in a deal 
(Lewis and Weigert 1985; Gambetta 2000). This raises another question: how can one 
determine who is trustworthy? As explained by Dasgupta (2000), trustworthiness not only 
depends on the history of the people since there is a boundary on how much we know, but 
also their incentives to pursue their self-interest and cheat in the current context. In other 
words, to be trustworthy requires one to convince others that they would not be opportunistic 
(Williamson 1993: 458). Therefore, the control of opportunistic incentives is critical to the 
promotion of trust and hence, collaboration (Powell 1990; Williamson 1993; Jones et al 
1997). There are two main forms of controls: institutional means and social norms (Coleman 
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1988; Hardin 1996). Regardless of the form of control, the ultimate goal is to ensure that 
dishonest behaviours are appropriately punished and that the “enforcement agency” itself is 
credible and trustworthy (Dasgupta 2000: 49).  
 
However, there are occasions where collaboration between criminals could occur in the 
absence of trust. In such cases, collaboration would only occur if possibility of betrayal is 
minimised using procedural arrangements such as testing and counting merchandise as well 
as anonymity and segmentation (von Lampe and Johansen 2003; 2004). Furthermore, 
violence is used to ensure contract compliance and criminals emerge as “entrepreneurs of 
trust via the threat and utility of violence” (Pearson and Hobbs 2003: 341). But, here the 
Internet presents another interesting deviation from traditional ‘off-line’ criminal 
collaboration. The use of violence as a safeguard for trust is not as easily available for 
collaborations over the Internet since virtual communication is often anonymous and spans 
across time, space and culture (Walther 1996; Jarvenpaa and Leidner 1999; Grabowski and 
Roberts 1999; Sandywell 2010). Furthermore, since trusting someone requires one to form an 
opinion and stereotype using the social information gathered on the person (Dasgupta 2000; 
Luhmann 2000; Tajfel 1982), trust over the Internet is even more difficult to achieve because 
the transfer of social information over computer-mediated communication (CMC) is reduced 
due to a lack of nonverbal and social context cues (Walther 1995; 1996). In other words, trust 
building over CMC requires more time investment than in Face to Face relationships. 
. 
As already mentioned, recent studies (Thomas and Martin 2006; Franklin et al 2007; Holt and 
Lampke 2010; Yip 2011) indicate that cybercriminals are extensively trading over the 
Internet with market-driven dynamics (Powell 1990). In essence, these “cyber-entrepreneurs” 
(Brenner 2002) are similar to the “free-trading entrepreneurs” engaged in drug dealing 
10 
 
(Pearson and Hobbs 2003; Morselli 2001). Further similarities can be found in the ways they 
interact as both studies report that the structure of the organised crime studied is not of a 
hierarchical orientation but rather, “flexible networks and partnerships” (Pearson and Hobbs 
2003: 344) between individual entrepreneurs who seek to “exploit specific types of 
entrepreneurial activities” (Brenner 2002: 45). Therefore, the exchanges between 
cybercriminals, at least in the underground economy, do not place emphasis on thick trust 
(Khodyakov 2007) or bonding capital (Lo 2010), that is, the strong interpersonal relationships 
such as families and close friends
5
. Rather, their relationships are built on thin trust 
(Khodyakov 2007) and these weak ties (Granovetter 1973) provide unique access to 
resources and opportunities outside of their immediate social circles (Burt 2000; Hobbs 2001; 
Pearson and Hobbs 2003; Lo 2010; Granovetter 1973; Uzzi 1997). Therefore, for 
cybercriminals to develop weak ties in the underground economy, they must be able to 
overcome the obstacles imposed by CMC on the transmission of social information that is 
necessary for them to develop thin trust.  In other words, cybercriminals require mechanisms 
that facilitate the development of initial trust (McKnight et al 1998). The focus of this paper 
is on one such mechanism: carding forums (Glenny 2011; Poulsen 2011). In order to 
understand the reasons why carding forums facilitate trust and thus collaboration between 
cybercriminals, this paper takes a unique approach by treating uncertainty, the main obstacle 
as well as the prerequisite to trust, as a transaction cost.  
 
 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) and Social Structures 
Since the aim of this paper is to address the structure of organised crime, the focus lies on the 
exchanges between the cyber-entrepreneurs (Brenner 2002; Morselli 2001; Hobbs 2003; Lo 
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 Although, see The Authors 2012 for a discussion of the need to be aware of the way that cybercrime can drift 
on and off line. 
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2010). Transaction cost economics (TCE) is therefore a suitable framework for this study 
because it focuses on the structure of governance by examining the transactions between 
parties (Williamson 1979). There are three behavioural assumptions in TCE (Williamson 
1979; 1991; 1993): bounded rationality, opportunism and risk neutrality. While the first two 
are aligned with the conditions of trust, the latter refers to the assumption that individuals are 
neither risk-averse nor risk-seeking. This assumption on risk neutrality is later addressed by 
Chiles and McMackin (1996) who argue that risk and trust have important implications for 
governance structure. So for the purposes of this paper, we regard this element as saying 
more about the creation of forums as a governance structure than an assumption that can 
apply to active agents. 
 
Based on these three assumptions, the principle argument behind transaction cost economics 
is that firms (can be an individual, group or corporation) have the incentive for economising 
transaction costs. There are three fundamental elements in transaction costs (Williamson 
(1979; 1991) frequency of transactions, asset specificity and uncertainty. The frequency of 
transactions refers to the likelihood of the transactions to recur over time. Asset specificity 
refers to the amount of assets required for a particular transaction which would otherwise 
have little to no value in other contexts. Both frequency and asset specificity influence the 
potential costs of mistrust due to uncertainty, thus driving a need for the trading parties to 
“devise a machinery” to “work things out” (Williamson 1979: 254). According to transaction 
cost economics (TCE), the incentive for minimising transaction costs influences the structure 
an organisation is likely to adopt (Williamson 1979; 1991; 1993; Thorelli 1986; Powell 1990). 
There are many types of economic institutions but they all fall in between the two extreme 
types of structures: markets and hierarchies. The dynamics of a typical market is summarised 
by Powell (1990): 
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Markets, as described by economic theory, are a spontaneous coordination mechanism 
that imparts rationality and consistency to the self-interested actions of individuals and 
firms…The market is open to all comers, but while it brings people together, it does 
not establish strong bonds of altruistic attachments. The participants in a market 
transaction are free of any future commitments. The stereotypical competitive market 
is the paradigm of individually self-interested, noncooperative, unconstrained social 
interaction.  
(1990: 302) 
On the other hand, in a hierarchical structure, there are 
clear departmental boundaries, clean lines of authority, detailed reporting mechanisms, 
and formal decision making procedures…The strength of hierarchical organization, 
then is its reliability – its capacity for producing large numbers of goods and services 
of a given quality repeatedly – and its accountability – its ability to document how 
resources are being used 
(1990: 303) 
In the absence of transaction costs, market structure is desired because it offers choice, 
flexibility and opportunity (Powell 1990: 302). Firms in a market are more likely to enjoy 
benefits from economies of scale (Brynjolfsson et al. 1988). However, the need for 
minimising transaction costs leads to the need for coordination. Therefore, a more elaborate 
governance structure such as a hierarchical structure is justified when it can offer 
considerable reduction in coordination costs which would otherwise be present in market-
oriented structures (Williamson 1979; Thorelli 1986; Powell 1990). This market-hierarchy 
argument will be used to demonstrate why carding forums are so well-suited for facilitating 
organised cybercrime. However, this should not be taken to mean that we afford all humans 
with pure rationality, it is bounded by context, messy and complicated (Giddens 1984; 
Granovetter 1985). However, the structure of the forum and the methods of minimising 
transaction costs no doubt enable crime where trust is an essential requirement and 





Uncertainties in the Underground Economy 
Carding involves a wide array of facilitating cybercrimes including those belonging to the 
category of “computer-assisted crimes” such as virtual robberies and thefts as well as 
“computer integrity crimes” such as hacking and cracking (Peretti 2008; Wall 2008). It is 
argued in this paper that there are two main sources of uncertainty carders face when trading 
in the underground economy:  
 Quality of the goods and services. 
 Identity of the trading partner, that is, whether the person is a true cybercriminal, an 
dishonest trader (a "ripper") or a law enforcement associate. 
Quality Uncertainty 
As observed by Thomas and Martin (2006) as well as Franklin et al (2007), carding has been 
active on the Internet Relay Chat (IRC). However, both studies have reported the prevalence 
of dishonest traders, known as “rippers". Herley and Florêncio (2010) argue that the impact 
of the ‘rippers’ on the underground economy can in fact be highly significant. They question 
why someone would sell bank accounts worth more than $2000 for only $0.50. Using the 
economic theory of asymmetric information better known as the “market for lemons” theory 
(Akerlof 1970), they argue that the majority of the goods and services traded over openly 
accessible channels such as the IRC are in fact “lemons” that are worth very little. The 
“market for lemons” theory addresses the problem of uncertainty in markets (Akerlof 1970). 
The theory Akerlof proposed is that uncertainty in the market arose because the sellers have 
more information about the true quality and value of the goods than the buyers. Hence, 
information is asymmetrical. Since buyers have incomplete information about the goods, they 
are unwilling to pay the price the sellers ask and so no quality goods are sold. Herley and 
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Florêncio (2010) argue that a lemon market will be produced if the following conditions are 
met: 
 An incentive exists for the seller to pass off a low quality product as a higher quality 
one. 
 Either there exist a continuum of seller qualities or the average seller type is 
sufficiently low. 
 Asymmetry of Information. 
 Sellers have no ways for credibly disclosing the quality of their goods. 
 Lack of Quality Assurance or Regulation. 
So, how is the stolen data market a lemon market? From the definition offered by Powell 
(1990: 302), a competitive market is made up of “individually self-interested, noncooperative, 
unconstrained social interaction”. Therefore, it can be assumed that in a stolen data market, 
there exists an incentive for the sellers to pass off a low quality product as a higher quality 
one. Furthermore, from previous studies on stolen data markets (Thomas and Martin 2006; 
Franklin et al 2007), there certainly exists either a continuum of seller qualities or the average 
seller type is low. Lastly, as observed by Thomas and Martin (2006), even administrators in 
the IRC channel can be cheats. Therefore, there is also a lack of trustworthy regulatory 
system for trading over the IRC. In essence, the underground economy as that observed on 
the IRC do exhibit all the characteristics associated with that of a market for “lemons”. 
 
Identity Uncertainty 
However, there is one more source of uncertainty in the underground economy that is 
potentially more costly than quality uncertainty: the true identity of a trader. Aside from 
dishonest traders, the cybercriminals also face the additional threat from law enforcement 
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associates such as undercover agents and informants pretending to be cybercriminals. 
However, it appears that the cybercriminals are well aware of this threat:  
This
6
 may be obvious to most people on this site, but I want to say it out loud for those 
who dont get it.  
We ARE visited by Governmental Agencies. Thats a fact. And without a doubt these 
Governmental Agencies are looking very close at certain members and maybe at this 
site as a whole.  
PLEASE keep that in mind when posting specifics about business, or giving away your 
drop addys
7
 to others, etc., etc. Try to deal with people that you know for a fact you 
can trust.  
Also, bear in mind that at some point one of these governmental agencies might get it 
in their thick piggy heads to set up some type of Sting Op. So again--be careful of who 
you deal with. 
 
By using transaction cost economics (TCE), the above demonstrates that the cost of 
uncertainty can be too high for conducting serious business in scale (Williamson 1979; 1991; 
Chiles and McMackin 1996) over the openly accessible channels such as the IRC. Therefore, 
according to Akerlof’s theory, such markets would fail, or at the very least, unable to scale.  
As Herley and Florêncio (2010) argue, the more serious underground businesses occur within 
closed organisations. The question here is why? What makes underground markets successful 
in closed organisations such as the carding forums discussed below, but not over the IRC?  
Carding Forums as Domesticated Markets 
Dimitry Golubov, a.k.a. Script, launched one of the first carding forums called Carderplanet 
in 2001 (Glenny 2011: 48). Carderplanet was designed to be the place where data thieves 
from all over the world could trade stolen data and related goods and services. However, with 
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 Where quotations from forums are used we present them as they appear, spelling and grammar mistakes 
included. 
7
 This refers to the address of a drop location. 
16 
 
the Internet booming, it is not surprising to find that Carderplanet was not alone. Andrew 
Mantovani, a 20 year-old part time business student in Arizona was also a member of a 
cybergang but one that mainly stored stolen data (Grow and Bush 2005). He realised that 
there was a need for a place to trade stolen data online and after meeting David Appleyard, a 
mortgage broker in his 40s, they founded ShadowCrew in 2002.  A snapshot of ShadowCrew 
is shown in figure 1. 
 
ShadowCrew was officially shut down by law enforcements as part of Operation Firewall in 
2004 (U.S. District Court 2004). According to the U.S. Department of Justice, members of 
ShadowCrew trafficked at least 1.7 million credit card numbers and caused total losses of at 
least $4 million
8
.  The same operation also led to the demise of Carderplanet. 
 
Figure 1: Snapshot of ShadowCrew. 
In order to fill the void left by Carderplanet and ShadowCrew, two carding forums emerged 
in 2005-2006: CardersMarket and Darkmarket (Glenny 2011; Poulsen 2011). Cardersmarket 
was founded by a security expert turned carder called Max Butler (aka Iceman). At the same 







, a.k.a. JiLsi, launched Darkmarket and both forums were 
engaged in a bitter board war
10
 (Glenny 2011; Poulsen 2011). This board war shows that 
carding forums are popular and valuable venues for cybercrime. The question is what do they 
offer that make them such popular venues? The following part of this paper looks to carding 
forums as the source of a unique data set. A forum stores the entire public facing discussions 
engaged in by carders. Once taken down by law enforcement, they are rarely available again 
to the public. Studying these forums has allowed us to understand the human foibles that pure 
quantitative network analysis cannot achieve (Webber and Yip 2013; Yip, Shadbolt and 
Webber 2012). What we demonstrate, therefore, is a form of analysis that places as much 
emphasis on the individuals as it does on the social network (Yip et al 2012). By doing so, we 
can see the way that rationality is indeed bounded by contradictions and complexities, but 
that the function of the forum remains conducive to the commission of credit card fraud on a 
massive scale.  
Inside a Carding Forum 
Much like conventional online discussion forums, carding forums are used mainly for trading 
carding goods and services. However, as shown in figure 2, each forum is typically divided 
into a series of sub-forums each dedicated to a particular type of content such as trading, 
tutorials, discussions and a blacklist of dishonest traders (the “rippers”). Users can start topics, 
also known as threads, which others can reply to. The forums also offer private messaging 
functionality which is often used by carders to carry out more detailed negotiations. Members 
are free to network with one another to engage in discussions and trading. A typical advert 
from a vendor is as shown in figure 3. Interested parties could either contact the vendor via 
private messaging on the forum or other means of contacts such as email or ICQ. 







However, these functionalities are common features amongst many online discussion forums 
so how do they facilitate the reduction of uncertainty in the underground economy?  
 
Figure 2: Sub forums on ShadowCrew. 
Mechanisms for Uncertainty Mitigation 
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As already discussed, this paper argues that there are two major sources of uncertainty and 
hence transaction cost in the underground economy: 
 Quality of the goods and services. 
 Identity of the trading partner, that is, whether the person is a true cybercriminal, an 
dishonest trader (a "ripper") or a law enforcement associate. 
 
Figure 3: A typical advert for stolen credit card data. 
The cost mitigating mechanisms offered by a carding forum are shown in figure 4.  By using 
carding forums, uncertainties surrounding the quality of traded commodities are mitigated 
through two mechanisms: a sophisticated review system and an exchange service known as 
the escrow service, commonly used in legitimate forms of transaction (Glenny 2011). 
Uncertainties around the identity of the traders are mitigated by allowing the cybercriminals 
to engage in social interactions in open discussions and knowledge exchange. Lastly, both of 
20 
 
these mechanisms are enforced through a well-defined management hierarchy. Each of these 
components is discussed in the following sections. 
 
Figure 4: Transaction cost mitigation by carding forums. 
Quality Assurance: Review and Escrow 
Reputation is the primary tool for trust preservation in the underground economy and 
reputation is attached to the nickname of a user. Therefore, the nicknames are treated like 
brands (Lusthaus 2012). However, it is important to realise why reputation is needed in the 
first place. It is needed because many who want to collaborate have no prior knowledge or 
experience with each other. Accumulating a reputation by behaving well over time is difficult 
and requires too much time because many cybercriminals refuse to deal with those without a 
reputation in the first place. In other words, for cybercriminals to collaborate with one 
another, they must be able to trust each other without requiring previous experience. 
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Therefore, there must be a mechanism capable of minimising the risk of opportunistic intents 
and facilitates the development of initial trust (Williamson 1993; McKnight et al 1998).  
To solve this problem, the cybercriminals have developed two reputation-based systems: 
 Reviewed Vendor 
 Escrow service 
In order to finally mitigate the problem of developing initial trust with potential buyers, the 
fastest route for a vendor is by obtaining the status “Reviewed Vendor”. This is achieved by 
having their goods and services reviewed by a trustworthy individual, most often, the senior 
members of a carding forum who are personally appointed by the administrators (more on 
this in the next section). 
Below is a typical review of a vendor: 
Hacker451
11
has already been reviewed for his ability to pul credit reports at will and 
in a variety of different way.  
 
Last week Neo contacted me and asked if I could review his CC Dumps. 
12
I agreed. 
Below is the review--I think most will be VERY happy with Hacker451.  
 
Hacker451 Provided a number of VISA Gold, Platinum, Corporate, and regular 
Dumps for review.  
 
In doing this review it was determined that the most strenuous test that one could do 
would be a CASH ADVANCE in a Hostile Enviroment. A LOT of folks may think that 
this was an unfair test, since most the other Dump suppliers on this board have 
certainly NOT undergone so dramatic a test. In truth, it was unfair, but there was a 
need for a dump supplier which could provide dumps that yeilded a sufficient 
profitable margin.  
 
                                                 
11
 Pseudonyms created by the authors are used throughout when using extracts from the forums. 
12
 Credit Card Dumps, the collection of data needed to produce a fake credit card or buy goods remotely over 
the Internet, for example. Often a dump can contain hundreds of credit card details (See Peretti 2008). 
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That being said--we put Hacker451’s cards to the test. Amounts were requested at a 
minimum of $1K to a max of...Well, it was a decent amount   .  
 
The results were very Good and cash was delivered without question. The results were 
so good, that additional CASH Advance testing WILL be done. There were Declines, 
BUT it seems lower than the 20% decline range quoted by other sellers. And these are 
certainly better performing dumps than I have seen with other vendors recently.  
 
VERY IMPRESSED with Hacker451 and his Dumps. From what I have seen and 
heard thus far—Hacker451 is THE man to see about dumps.  
 Hacker451IS A VERIFIED AND REVIEWED SELLER OF CC DUMPS (TRACKS). 
Those looking to purchase merchandise would then look to buy from vendors who hold the 
“Reviewed Vendor” status and if the service is good then they would remember the nickname 
and collaboration could recur. Therefore, gaining the status of a Reviewed Vendor can be 
seen as a long term solution for those looking to remain in the business beyond the 
transaction (von Lampe 2004). 
However, this could be too much trouble for those looking to make transactions only on 
occasions. This is where an alternative mechanism comes into play: escrow service.  
A vendor would provide the escrow officer with a sample of his wares (a dozen or so 
credit card numbers and PINSs) while the potential buyer would send the money to 
him at the same time. The escrow officer would then test the wares and, if they 
delivered the cash as promised, he would release the money to the vendor and the 
dumps and PINS to the buyer. 
(Glenny 2011: 55) 
 
Below is an extract from a carding forum asking for an escrow service: 
Trickster: Do you plan to make an escrow service? 
It must be some respected and trustworthy 




Cardpro: Of course, we have Reviewed Vendors, 
but sometimes there are such deals that 
need escrow as a guarantee. 
It is clear from this extract that not everyone can be an escrow officer. In order to be one, one 
must be a trusted member and more importantly, they must be trusted by both the vendor and 
the buyer. Furthermore, the extract also shows that the trust signals from a Reviewed Vendor 
may not be enough for certain types of transactions. This further highlights the importance of 
trust in cybercriminal trading. From our observations, an escrow officer usually charges a 5-
10% commission for the service. 
 
In essence, both systems facilitate the development of a type of trust called institution-based 
trust (McKnight et al 1998: 475) where “one believes the necessary impersonal structures are 
in place to enable one to act in anticipation of a successful future endeavour”. Furthermore, 
McKnight et al (1998) argue that institution-based trust promotes the growth of initial trust 
because firstly, it provides an ordered predictable setting (situational normality) and as 
discussed in a previous section, a predictable context is vital to the development of trust 
(Gambetta 2000; Dasgupta 2000). Secondly, both systems provide “structural assurance” 
where risks are mitigated due to some form of guarantee. 
Identity Assurance: Social Networking 
Aside from uncertainties over the quality of the goods and services offered, the 
cybercriminals are also uncertain about the true identity of their trading partner. That is, they 
have trouble identifying whether their trading partner is a fellow cybercriminal, a ripper or a 
law enforcement associate pretending to be a cybercriminal. 
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As already introduced, carding forums commonly have dedicated sections for general 
discussions and tutorials. These sections facilitate the social networking between the 
cybercriminals and this facilitates the trust mechanisms already introduced.  
In essence, the primary resource these sub-forums facilitate is the transfer of information 
which can be specialised knowledge (such as technical tutorials) or general information about 
related goods and services as well as potential threats. Below is an extract from a forum 
thread warning others of potential threat from a law enforcement agency: 
I have been told to post this by a friend of mine Hax0r who I have trusted for years 
and also has done business with vendors on this forum now and back in the ** days. 
He was made an offer by law enforcement to help out in a sting operation on this 
forum. This offer was made IN PERSON at his work. Not that it couldn't be faked but 
he said they were the "real deal" and had identification and everything. 
I am posting this for him as he asked me to do so to remain anonymous. I would not 
recommend any new formed relations or not pursue any team work that was recently 
planned out if you have any chance of getting screwed because of this garbage. He did 
not help these guys, nor does he plan on it... but I am sure if they pin point the right 
people, they will do whatever law enforcement tells them to. 
SO BE CAREFUL. 
By offering a space for cybercriminals to engage in reciprocal and mutually beneficial acts 
such as the exchange of valuable information, these are the symbolic interactions through 
which in-group identity and group classification can be developed (Fehr et al 2002; Tajfel 
1982; Ashforth and Mael 1989). This allows the members to develop an understanding of the 
prototypical characteristics of the group and this implicitly gives them the ability to identify 
those who do not belong to the group. In other words, social networking facilitates the 
emergence of informal social control in the underground economy (Williams 2007; Wall and 
Williams 2007).  
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This is demonstrated by an extract from a forum thread where members of the carding forum 
engage in a topic that touches on regret, risk and the difference between a ‘normal’ life and 
that of a carder:  
Looper123: People who's life is carding and other type of frauds (so no fucking 
students who do this part-time) :  
Do you sometimes wish you just had a normal life, with this I mean normal job, no 
stress about ops, making money, Law Enforcement  etc?  
or are you 100% happy with ur 'underground ops life' ?  
I would appreciate any input/thoughts 
------ 
Dumpster: I wish I had a normal life. Turn back the clock and all, but fuck it I am 
where I am. 
------ 
CardPhreak: Are you kidding me!!! Normal life with no stress.  
No such thing, there will always be stress unless you live in fantasy land.  
There may be different types of stress but it will always be there.  
As for regret. I regret being too honest and living the so called normal for far too long 
before I found out how much money could be made in this business. 
------ 
Looper123: there is a HUGE difference between 'normal life stress' and this 
business's stress.. I think you just started out in this business.. i wanna hear ur 
thoughts after 5 months 
------ 
CardPhreak: It is like any other business, what makes it different is the Law 
Enforcement, so I would not say "fuck 'em" The thing is there is not much to regret 
until you get busted. The hard question is would you regret what you had done after 
that? 
------ 
Dumpster: Some parts of it I love. I'm a total loaner outsider, some by choice and 
some by the fact I've never been the type of guys that gets the girls or anything. Doing 
what I'm doing kind of makes me feel like I'm doing something...something a little 
risky...then when i do something, I still sometimes feel guilty about the people I'm 
doing it to. I hate that part of it. I'm never going to have a normal life even if I try, so 
this life, as ****** says, "For those who wish to play in the shadows" I love the 
shadows. I love doing things in the shadows. That's where I'm comfortable. 
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The last post by Dumpster reminds us that understanding the structure of the forums must not 
be pursued at the expense of the agency of those involved, their human foibles. Our argument 
in this paper maybe about the structure of carding forums and how this facilitates trust to 
enable an illegal profit-making enterprise, but we are also aware of the actors’ own conflicts 
(see Webber and Yip 2013 for a fuller account of this argument). Lastly, by giving the 
cybercriminals an open and asynchronous space to socialise, it gives rise to a historical 
account of behaviour which is archived and made navigable. In essence, the discussion sub-
forum becomes a rich source of social information for the forum members to form an 
accurate opinion of others when they are making initial trust decisions (Dasgupta 2000) as 
well as facilitating the strengthening of existing trust relationships (McKnight et al 1998).  
Control: Hierarchical Management and Network Boundary 
Having a reliable reputation system alone is not enough for the market to develop and this is 
why the underground markets over the IRC will fail (Herley and Florêncio2010). Due to the 
ways in which online discussion forums are designed, carding forums have an inherently 
hierarchical management structure (U.S. District Court 2004; Paget 2008). Such a 
management hierarchy is shown in figure 5. 
So, what are the benefits of this hierarchy? Firstly, the most obvious function of a 
management hierarchy is the centralisation of authority (Tsai 2002). 
Here is an example regarding the banning of a suspicious user: 
He is dropped from the vendor list. I can't ban him outright since I'm not an admin, 
but that wouldn't do any good anyways. You guys with information on him need to 





Figure 5: Typical management hierarchy on carding forums. 
 
It is evident from this extract that the scope of privileges and functionalities of each role in 
the hierarchy are strictly adhered to. This is important as it allows critical decisions to 
propagate up the hierarchy, hence the centralisation of authority. 
Secondly, this management hierarchy, as shown in figure 5, represents the clearest way of 
communicating trustworthiness based on commitment (Hardin 1996). Administrators are the 
owners of the forum (Glenny 2011; Poulsen 2011) and they are the ultimate decision makers 
of the forum. In terms of commitment, they are perceived as the most committed because 
they have committed resources such as money and time into operating the venue. Therefore, 
the trustworthiness of the administrators is more or less implicit from the forum members. 
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This has a domino effect on the establishment of initial trust in the market. From this single 
point, trust is propagated down the hierarchy as the occupiers of the roles below the 
administrators are either: (1) those trusted by the administrators personally or (2) trusted by 
the ones above in the chain of command (Glenny 2011; Poulsen 2011). In any case, 
trustworthiness is clearly communicated through this hierarchy and communication is 
fundamental to cooperation (Gambetta 2000): 
Therefore, the management hierarchy of carding forums are instrumental in two ways: firstly, 
it gives a clear line of authority for centralised coordination and thus significantly reducing 
coordination costs which would otherwise exist in pure market environment such as those 
over the IRC (Williamson 1979; Powell 1990; Brynjolfsson et al 1988). Secondly, it 
facilitates the clear communication of trust among cybercriminals and allows trust to be 
reliably propagated through the social network. 
However, even with a sophisticated trust mechanism including a hierarchy, it is useless 
unless it is properly enforced (Dasgupta 2000). That is, those who break the rules should be 
punished accordingly and banned users should be kept permanently away. Fortunately for the 
cybercriminals, another useful functionality facilitated by a forum is that it provides a 
network boundary through membership control. In effect, a forum segregates its members 
from other Internet users, giving the administrators full control on who should and should not 
be a member of the forum. Furthermore, membership facilitates accountability in any 
wrongdoing.  
 
However, one of the most challenging problems for carding forum administrators is how an 
unwanted visitor such as an exposed “ripper” could be kept permanently away from the 
market? Afterall, the user could simply return and register under a different “nic” (Herley and 
Florêncio 2010; F.B.I. 2012). With the anonymity offered by the Internet, how can 
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administrators tell whether two users belong to the same person? As it turns out, this is one of 
the most difficult challenges for carding forum administrators. On the one hand, the only way 
in which they could keep exposed rippers from returning to the forum is by removing the 
ability to register altogether or at least for a long enough period to keep away the rippers who 
are less determined. On the other hand, they are faced with the demand for new members as 
they are the ones who provide new demands and supplies, ideas and opportunities to the 
market. This struggle is made explicit by the following extract from a forum post regarding 
the closing of registration:  
------ 
ForumAdministrator: i hope to close it for ever so the rippers will not be able to 
register again and make more scammes 
 
WiFiHiFi: And we would have no more new vendors, no more new intelligent 
members with new ideas, etc. 
 
Colossus: Is membership registration closed? 
 
ForumAdministrator: It is temporary closed due to release of popular Russian 
magazine called "Hacker". It was a special release only about carding. This magazine 
is being released by lamers and read by lamers and working not as informative tool 
but as a tool of attracting unnecessary attention of people who want "Everything and 
Now" without doing anything. We already encounter a huge flow of teenagers posting 
dumb questions, in wrong parts of forum, etc. 
 
WiFiHiFi: And we would have no more new vendors, no more new intelligent 
members with new ideas, etc. 
 
ForumAdministrator:For those who have an expirience, knowledge, good attitude and 
behavior still may and do e-mail me for registering a new account at 
DarkCreditCarding forums. My e-mail for new registration is ******@******.net 




There are two common strategies used by administrators to deter unwanted guests from 
joining the forum: impose a cost to membership (F.B.I. 2012) or disabling registration 
altogether.  On this occasion, the administrator chose to make it more difficult to register 
rather than removing registration altogether. This shows that new members are vital for the 
underground economy. 
Implications for Cybercrime Policing 
In summary, this paper has revealed why carding forums are repeatedly chosen by 
cybercriminals to operate online underground markets despite numerous previous takedowns 
by law enforcement (Glenny 2011; Poulsen 2011). There are several important implications 
for the law enforcement community. 
Firstly, this paper has revealed that trust is vital in collaboration between cybercriminals and 
so, merely being in contact with other cybercriminals, such as that on the IRC, is not 
sufficient for serious trading to occur in scale (Herley and Florêncio 2010). In essence, the 
market will fail in the absence of trust as transaction costs are too high. Therefore, it is vital 
for the law enforcement community to prevent cybercriminals from developing trust and 
particular attention should be placed on preventing cybercriminals from forming initial trust 
in the first instance. This can be achieved in three ways: (1) a Sybil attack (Doucer 2002) 
whereby law enforcement increase the number of rippers or undercover agents in the 
underground economy in order to erode trust among cybercriminals. For future work, we aim 
to evaluate the effectiveness of this technique through the use of simulation and agent-based 
modelling (Carley et al 2002; Carley 2006); (2) increase the cost of misplaced trust such as 
more severe sentencing; (3) since it is shown that forums are facilitators of trust development 
among cybercriminals, the taking down of carding forums should be made a priority.  
Furthermore, the model shown in fig. 4 can be used for horizon scanning by examining 
31 
 
whether a particular web application is likely to be used to facilitate online underground 
trading. 
Secondly, it is evident that there is no guaranteed trust in the underground economy. Even 
with a system such as a carding forum that is capable of providing multiple channels for trust 
to develop, there is still room for mistrust.  Although this mistrust may lie partly with the 
naivety or carelessness of some cybercriminals, perhaps because they have a higher 
propensity for risk-taking (McCarthy and Hagan 2001; Chiles and McMackin 1996), this 
demonstrates that trust remains the primary vulnerability in organised cybercrime.    
Thirdly, regarding police infiltration operations on carding forums such as Darkmarket 
(Glenny 2011), the findings from this paper show that it is important for undercover agents to 
focus not just on obtaining formal positions in the hierarchy but also to focus on portraying 
themselves as a true cybercriminal by demonstrating prototypical characteristics of the group. 
Since contents on the forums are archived and made navigable, any anomalies in their 
behaviour are recorded and can be called upon when accusations are made against them. 
Some of the trust “signals” cybercriminals or hackers normally expect from their colleagues 
are introduced by Holt (2010) and Lusthaus (2012). 
Fourthly, regarding the structure of cybercriminal groups, Brenner (2002) speculated that 
cybercriminals will engage in “lateral relationships”, networks instead of hierarchies”. 
However, although network is the ideal form of organization for the cybercriminals due to its 
inherent flexibility and adaptability (Powell 1990; Thorelli 1996), the prevalence of mistrust 
in the underground economy means that adopting a purely lateral network organisation 
structure is inappropriate due to the high transaction costs involved (Williamson 1979 and 
1991; Powell 1990; Chiles and McMackin 1996). Therefore, contrary to Brenner’s 




However, the form of hierarchical organisation appearing in cybercrime, namely the carding 
forums, is different from that of traditional crime groups observed by Brenner (2002). In 
carding forums, the management hierarchy is there for administrative and regulatory purposes 
and not necessarily coordinating the allocation of resources and members of the forums are 
certainly not in the direct command of hierarchy. Members are autonomous individuals free to 
pursue their self-interest to a limited extent.  
Furthermore, this paper has only demonstrated that a hybrid form of organisation structure 
facilitates the emergence of scalable trading among cybercriminals. Since there exists a wide 
variety of online crime groups as introduced by Lusthaus (2012), the hybrid structure revealed 
in this paper should not be treated as the definitive structure of organised cybercrime.  
Therefore, this paper concurs with Brenner’s speculation ten years ago that: 
… as opposed to the localized, rigid, and often provincial hierarchical organizations 
that have so far characterized criminal groups, regional, or even global, collations will 
develop. These collations will be composed of sole cybercrime entrepreneurs and 
members of diffuse, loosely-structured opportunity groups, criminal associative 
entities that come together to exploit specific types of entrepreneurial activities… 
This new model means there are no set, fixed, easily tracked criminal organizations. It 
also means online criminals can collaborate as necessary but run relatively little risk 
that their colleagues in crime will be able to inform on them to law enforcement 
because partners in crime will no longer know who their collaborators are or where 
they are located 
(2002: 45) 
Hence, it is important to recognise that the disruption of a carding forum is merely the 
disruption of one of many online underground markets currently operating over the Internet 
and remnants from these forums are free to continue their criminal ventures over other 
channels such as the IRC, ICQ or email with trusted contacts developed from their time on 




By using data from online underground markets (known as carding forums) previously in 
operation over the Internet, this paper has revealed the vital role trust plays in the 
collaborations between cybercriminals. Using a mixture of theories from organised crime and 
transaction cost economics (TCE), this paper revisits previous criminological work on the 
structure of organised cybercrime a decade ago by Mann and Sutton (1998) and Brenner 
(2002). Furthermore, this paper has revealed the main reason why cybercriminals have 
repeatedly chosen to use online forums to operate online underground markets is due to the 
hybrid organisation structure they offer. It is revealed in this paper that the inherent structure 
of online discussion forums facilitates a comprehensive trust mechanism that is able to 
maintain a sufficient level of trust among cybercriminals for a scalable competitive market to 
emerge. This ability to maintain trust helps the underground economy to grow, giving the 
cybercriminals the incentives to innovate. It is this innovative drive which has ultimately 
turned cybercrime into the persistent problem we are facing today. Therefore, although 
Brenner was correct in predicting the preference for lateral networks, we have revealed that 
due to the need to maintain trust, a hierarchical management structure is required to oversee 
the lateral network of cybercriminals if an underground market is to succeed and grow. As 
such, we argue that profit driven cybercriminals will continue to pursue a hybrid organisation 
structure in order to host domesticated markets. Since online discussion forums possess such 
inherent structural properties, we therefore propose that law enforcement agencies should 
treat forum take-downs as priorities as they are the primary facilitators for the development of 
trust among cybercriminals, thus pivotal to the growth of the underground economy. 
References 
Akerlof, G., (1970). ‘The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism’. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84 (3), 488–500. 
34 
 
Arndt, J., (1979). ‘Toward a Concept of Domesticated Markets’. Journal of Marketing, 43 (4), 
69–75. 
Ashforth, B. and Mael, F., (1989). ‘Social Identity Theory and the Organization’. The 
Academy of Management Review, 14 (1), 20–39. 
Bourdieu, P., (1986). ‘The Forms of Capital’. In: J. Richardson, (ed.) Handbook of Theory 
and Research for the Sociology of Education. New York, 241–258. 
Brenner, S., (2002). ‘Organized Cybercrime ? How Cyberspace May Affect the Structure of 
Criminal Relationships’. North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology, 41 (1984), 1–50. 
Brynjolfsson, E., Malone, T., and Gurbaxani, V., (1988). ‘Markets, hierarchies and the 
impact of information technology’. MIT Center for Coordination Science Technical 
Report 106 http://econpapers.repec.org/paper/mitsloanp/2229.htm 
Burt, R.S., (2000). ‘The Network Structure of Social Capital’, in R. I. Sutton & B. M. Staw, 
(eds). Research in Organizational Behavior, 22 (May), pp.345–423.  
Carley, K.M., Lee, J., and Krackhardt, D., (2002). ‘Destabilizing Networks’. Connections, 24 
(3), 79–92. 
Carley, K., (2006). ‘Destabilization of Covert Networks’. Computational & Mathematical 
Organization Theory, 12 (1), 51–66. 
Chiles, T.H. and McMackin, J.F., (1996). ‘Integrating Variable Risk Preferences, Trust, and 
Transaction Cost Economics’. The Academy of Management Review, 21 (1), 73–99. 
Coleman, J.S., (1988). ‘Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital’. American Journal 
of Sociology, 94, 95–120. 
Dasgupta, P., (2000). ‘Trust as a Commodity’. in: D. Gambetta, (ed.) Trust: Making and 
Breaking Cooperative Relations. Department of Sociology, University of Oxford, 49 – 
72. 
Douceur, J.R., (2002). ‘The Sybil Attack’. in: Revised Papers from the First International 
Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems. London, UK: Springer-Verlag, 251–260. 
F.B.I., (2012). ‘Manhattan U.S. Attorney and FBI Assistant Director in Charge Announce 24 
Arrests in Eight Countries as Part of International Cyber Crime Takedown’ [online]. 
Available from: http://www.fbi.gov/newyork/press-releases/2012/manhattan-u.s.-
attorney-and-fbi-assistant-director-in-charge-announce-24-arrests-in-eight-countries-as-
part-of-international-cyber-crime-takedown [Accessed 23 Jan 2013]. 
Fehr, E., Fischbacher, U., and Gächter, S., (2002). ‘Strong reciprocity, human cooperation, 
and the enforcement of social norms’. Human Nature, 13 (1), 1–25. 
Franklin, J., Paxson, V., Perrig, A., and Savage, S., (2007). ‘An inquiry into the nature and 
causes of the wealth of internet miscreants’. In: Proceedings of the 14th ACM 
35 
 
conference on Computer and communications security. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 
375–388. 
Gambetta, D., (2000). ‘Can We Trust Trust?’ in D. Gambetta, (ed.) Trust: Making and 
Breaking Cooperative Relations. Department of Sociology, University of Oxford, 213 – 
237. 
Gambetta, D., (2008). ‘Trust’s Odd Ways’. in J. Elster, O. Gjelsvik, A. Hylland, and K. 
Moene, (eds.) Understanding Choice, Explaining Behaviour: Essays in Honour of Ole-
Jørgen Skog. Oslo: Unipub Forlag/Oslo Academic Press, 81–100. 
Giddens, A., (1984). The Constitution of Society. Cambridge: Polity. 
Glenny, M., (2011). Darkmarket: Cyberthieves, Cybercops and You. London: The Bodley 
Head. 
Grabowski, M. and Roberts, K.H., (1999). ‘Risk Mitigation in Virtual Organizations’. 
Organization Science, 10 (6), 704–721. 
Granovetter, M., (1973). ‘The Strength of Weak Ties’. The American Journal of Sociology, 
78, 1360–1380. 
Granovetter, M., (1985). ‘Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of 
Embeddedness’. in Readings in Economic Sociology. Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 63–68. 
Grow, B. and Bush, J., (2005). Hacker Hunters [online]. Bloomberg BusinessWeek Magazine. 
Available from: http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2005-05-29/hacker-hunters 
[Accessed23 Jan 2013]. 
Hardin, R., (1996). ‘Trustworthiness’. Ethics, 107 (1), 26–42. 
Herley, C. and Florêncio, D., (2010). ‘Nobody Sells Gold for the Price of Silver: Dishonesty, 
Uncertainty and the Underground Economy’. Economics of Information Security and 
Privacy, 33–53. 
HM Government, (2010). The National Security Strategy. London: Her Majesty’s Stationary 
Office 
Hobbs, D., (2001). ‘THE FIRM: Organizational Logic and Criminal Culture on a Shifting 
Terrain’. British Journal of Criminology, 41, 549–560. 
Holt, T.J., (2010). ‘Examining the Role of Technology in the Formation of Deviant 
Subcultures’ . Social Science Computer Review , 28 (4 ), 466–481. 
Holt, T.J. and Lampke, E., (2010). ‘Exploring stolen data markets online: products and 
market forces’. Criminal Justice Studies, 23 (1), 33–50. 
IC3, 2012. IC3 2011 Internet Crime Report. Available at: 




Jarvenpaa, S.L. and Leidner, D.E., (1999). ‘Communication and Trust in Global Virtual 
Teams’. Organization Science, 10 (6), 791–815. 
Jones, C., Hesterly, W.S., and Borgatti, S.P., (1997). ‘A General Theory of Network 
Governance: Exchange Conditions and Social Mechanisms’. The Academy of 
Management Review, 22 (4), 911–945. 
Kenney, M., (2007). ‘The Architecture of Drug Trafficking: Network Forms of Organisation 
in the Colombian Cocaine Trade’. Global Crime, 8 (3), 233–259. 
Khodyakov, D., (2007). ‘Trust as a Process’. Sociology, 41 (1), 115–132. 
Levi, M., (2008). ‘Organized Fraud and Organizing Frauds’. Criminology and Criminal 
Justice, 8 (4), 389–419. 
Lewis, J.D. and Weigert, A., (1985). ‘Trust as a Social Reality’. Social Forces, 63 (4), 967–
985. 
Lo, T.W., (2010). ‘Beyond Social Capital: Triad Organized Crime in Hong Kong and China’. 
British Journal of Criminology, 50 (5), 851–872. 
Luhmann, N., (2000). ‘Familiarity, Confidence, Trust: Problems and Alternatives’. in D. 
Gambetta, (ed.) Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations. Department of 
Sociology, University of Oxford, 94 – 107. 
Lusthaus, J., (2012). ‘Trust in the World of Cybercrime’. Global Crime, 13 (2), 71–94. 
Mann, D. and Sutton, M., (1998). ‘>>NETCRIME: More Change in the Organization of 
Thieving’. British Journal of Criminology, 38 (2), 201–229. 
McCarthy, B. and Hagan, J., (1995). ‘Getting into Street Crime: The Structure and Process of 
Criminal Embeddedness’. Social Science Research, 24 (1), 63–95. 
McCarthy, B. and Hagan, J., (2001). ‘When Crime Pays: Capital, Competence, and Criminal 
Success’. Social Forces, 79 (3), 1035–1060. 
McCarthy, B., Hagan, J., and Cohen, L.E., (1998). ‘Uncertainty, Cooperation, and Crime: 
Understanding the Decision to Co-offend’. Social Forces, 77 (1), 155–184. 
McIllwain, J.S., (1999). ‘Organized crime: A Social Network Approach’. Crime, Law and 
Social Change, 32 (4), 301–323. 
McKnight, D.H., Cummings, L.L., and Chervany, N.L., (1998). ‘Initial Trust Formation in 
New Organizational Relationships’. The Academy of Management Review, 23 (3), 473–
490. 
Möllering, G., (2001). ‘The Nature of Trust: From Georg Simmel to a Theory of Expectation, 
Interpretation and Suspension’. Sociology , 35 (2 ), 403–420. 
37 
 
Morselli, C., (2001). ‘Structuring Mr. Nice: Entrepreneurial opportunities and brokerage 
positioning in the cannabis trade’. Crime, Law and Social Change, 35 (3), 203–244. 
Morselli, C. and Petit, K., (2007). ‘Law-Enforcement Disruption of a Drug Importation 
Network’. Global Crime, 8 (2), 109–130. 
Pearson, G. and Hobbs, D., (2003). ‘King Pin? A Case Study of a Middle Market Drug 
Broker’. The Howard Journal of Criminal Justice, 42 (4), 335–347. 
Peretti, K.K., (2008). ‘Data Breaches: What the underground world of “carding” reveals’. 
Santa Clara Computer and High Technology Journal, 25, 375–414. 
Portes, A., (1998). ‘Social Capital: Its Origins and Applications in Modern Sociology’. 
Annual Review of Sociology, 24 (1), 1–24. 
Poulsen, K., (2011). Kingpin: How one hacker took over the billion-dollar cybercrime 
underground. New York: Crown Publishing. 
Powell, W.W., (1990). ‘Neither market nor hierarchy: network forms of organization’. 
Research In Organizational Behavior, 12 (1), 295–336. 
PwC, (2012). UK Information Security Breaches Survey. Available at: 
http://www.pwc.co.uk/audit-assurance/publications/uk-information-security-breaches-
survey-results-2012.jhtml (Accessed January 29th 2013) 
Sandywell, B., (2010). ‘On the Globalisation of Crime: the Internet and New Criminality’. in 
Y. Jewkes and M. Yar, (eds.) Handbook of Internet Crime. Devon: Willan Publishing, 
38–66. 
Tajfel, H., (1982). ‘Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations’. Annual Review of Psychology, 
33 (1), 1–39. 
Thomas, R. and Martin, J., (2006). ‘the underground economy : priceless’. The USENIX 
Magazine, 31 (6), 7–16. 
Thorelli, H.B., (1986). ‘Networks: Between markets and hierarchies’. Strategic Management 
Journal, 7 (1), 37–51. 
Tsai, W., (2002). ‘Social Structure of “Coopetition” within a Multiunit Organization: 
Coordination, Competition, and Intraorganizational Knowledge Sharing’. Organization 
Science, 13 (2), 179–190. 
U.S. District Count, (2004). Operation Firewall Indictment. U.S. District Court, District of 
New Jersey. Available at: 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/nj/press/files/pdffiles/firewallindct1028.pdf [Accessed 31 
Jan 2010]. 
Uzzi, B., (1997). ‘Social Structure and Competition in Interfirm Networks: The Paradox of 
Embeddedness’. Administrative Science Quarterly, 42 (1), 35–67. 
38 
 
Van Calster, P., 2006. Re-visiting Mr. Nice. On Organized Crime as Conversational 
Interaction. Crime, Law and Social Change, 45 (4), 337–359. 
von Lampe, K., (2003). ‘Criminally Exploitable Ties: A Network Approach to Organized 
Crime’. In E. Viano, J. Magallones and L. Bridel (eds.) Transnational Organized Crime: 
Myth, Power, and Profit. North Carolina: Carolina Academic Press, 9–22. 
von Lampe, K. and Johansen, P., (2003). ‘Criminal Networks and Trust. On the importance 
of expectations of loyal behaviour in criminal relations’. In: The 3rd annual meeting of 
the European Society of Criminology (ESC). 102–113. 
von Lampe, K. and Johansen, P., (2004). ‘Organized Crime and Trust: On the 
conceptualization and empirical relevance of trust in the context of criminal networks’. 
Global Crime, 6 (2), 159–184. 
Wall, D.S., (2008). Cybercrime: The Transformation of Crime in the Information Age. 
Malden: Polity Press. 
Wall, D.S. and Williams, M., (2007). ‘Policing Diversity in the Digital Age’. Criminology 
and Criminal Justice, 7 (4), 391–415. 
Walther, J.B., (1995). ‘Relational Aspects of Computer-Mediated Communication: 
Experimental Observations over Time’. Organization Science, 6 (2), 186–203. 
Walther, J.B., (1996). ‘Computer-Mediated Communication: Impersonal, Interpersonal, and 
Hyperpersonal Interaction’. Communication Research, 23 (1), 3–43. 
Wasserman, S. and Faust, K., (1994). Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications 
(Structural Analysis in the Social Sciences). Cambridge University Press. 
Webber, C. and Yip, M., 2013. Drifting on and off-line: humanising the cyber criminal. In: S. 
Winlow and R. Atkinson, eds. New Directions in Crime and Deviancy. Abington: 
Routledge, 191–205. 
Weerman, F.M., (2003). ‘Co-offending as Social Exchange. Explaining Characteristics of 
Co‐offending’. British Journal of Criminology, 43 (2), 398–416. 
Williams, M., (2007). ‘Policing and Cybersociety: The Maturation of Regulation within an 
Online Community’. Policing and Society, 17 (1), 59–82. 
Williams, P., (1998). ‘The Nature of Drug-Trafficking Networks’. Current History, 97 (618), 
154–159. 
Williamson, O.E., (1979). ‘Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual 
Relations’. Journal of Law and Economics, 22 (2), 233–261. 
Williamson, O.E., (1991). ‘Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete 
Structural Alternatives’. Administrative Science Quarterly, 36 (2), 269–296. 
39 
 
Williamson, O.E., (1993) ‘Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization’. Journal of 
Law and Economics, 36 (1), 453–486. 
Yip, M., 2011. An Investigation into Chinese Cybercrime and the Applicability of Social 
Network Analysis. In: ACM Web Science Conference 2011, Koblenz, 14-17 June. 
Yip, M., Shadbolt, N., and Webber, C., 2012. Structural Analysis of Online Criminal Social 
Networks. In: D. Zeng, L. Zhou, B. Cukic, G. Wang, and C. Yang, eds. IEEE 
International Conference on Intelligence and Security Informatics (ISI) 2012, 
Washington D.C., 11-14 June. Piscataway: IEEE, 60–65. 
Yip, M., Shadbolt, N., Tiropanis, T., and Webber, C., 2012. The Digital Underground 
Economy: a Social Network Approach to Understanding Cybercrime. In: Digital 
Futures 2012: The Third Annual Digital Economy All Hands Conference, Aberdeen, 23-
25 October. Aberdeen. 
 
